Threats to Voting

Status: Documented presidential rhetoric

At a September Republican midterm convention, Trump asked supporters to repeat: "I don't care if I'm registered or not, I'm gonna try and cheat like hell like they do." The broader passage encouraged turnout and may be defended as humor, but a president instructing followers to recite language endorsing cheating and voting without registration risks normalizing illegal conduct.

Status: Passed the House, stalled in the Senate, not current federal law

The legislation would require documentary proof of citizenship when registering or updating a registration, impose a federal photo identification requirement, and require voter roll comparisons with federal databases. Millions of eligible citizens lack a readily available passport, birth certificate, or similar document. Married voters whose current names differ from their birth certificates could face additional paperwork. Rural voters, older citizens, low-income voters, tribal citizens, and people born outside hospitals could be especially burdened.

Status: Supreme Court stay issued September 2026; underlying litigation continues

The Supreme Court temporarily allowed the administration to resume an expanded version of the federal Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program while the case proceeds. The modified system permits citizenship checks using Social Security Administration records and can process large numbers of voter records. The Court did not order states to use SAVE, authorize automatic removals, or finally decide every legal issue in the case.

Status: Active federal voter fraud investigations and data collection documented; proposed undercover activity not confirmed; related allegations remain under investigation

The Department of Homeland Security has developed an initiative using immigration and other federal databases to identify suspected non-citizen voters. Database matching can produce false positives because of outdated citizenship records, similar names, and incomplete data. A September federal complaint incorporates the initiative into a broader voter intimidation claim and alleges that officials knowingly continued referrals despite concerns about unreliable data. Those assertions remain allegations and have not been adjudicated.

Status: DOJ's nationwide Voter List Maintenance Policy vacated by a federal court on October 2026; appeal and implementation status should be tracked

The Justice Department demanded statewide voter files, sometimes including sensitive identifying information, and sought to compare them with federal citizenship records and press states to remove voters it deemed ineligible. Many states resisted and courts rejected a number of DOJ's state-by-state demands.

Status: Blocked for the election; potentially revivable later

The administration directed the Postal Service to develop uniform ballot envelope designs, individualized barcodes, voter list uploads, and additional verification requirements. Election officials warned that the unfinished system introduced after voting had begun could disrupt lawful election mail or allow mail to be refused from jurisdictions that did not comply. The Supreme Court declined to reinstate the requirements for the election, although the underlying legal dispute could return in a future election.

Status: Continuing legislation and litigation

Some proposals and lawsuits seek to invalidate ballots that voters mailed by Election Day but that election offices receive afterward, even where existing state law permits a receipt period. Changing those rules close to an election could disqualify lawful voters because of postal delays beyond their control. Clear deadlines are legitimate, but voters must receive adequate notice and realistic mailing time.

Status: Active and documented; direct alteration of official registrations or ballots has not been established

VoteSafe.org presents itself as a voter assistance website offering registration checks, voting information, and election reminders. The site is operated by Elon Musk's America PAC rather than by a government election agency or an independent nonpartisan organization. To check a registration, it requests information including a voter's name, birth date, mailing address, email address, and telephone number. VoteSafe also acknowledges that its election information comes from third parties, may not be accurate, and should be confirmed with state or local election officials.

Status: Announced plan

The Justice Department announced plans to deploy as many as approximately 1,000 personnel in connection with the election. Federal monitoring has a legitimate history when used transparently to protect voting rights and enforce court orders. A deployment becomes concerning if personnel are armed, immigration-focused, inadequately trained, concentrated selectively in opposition-leaning communities, or used to challenge voters rather than protect access. The mission, authority, locations, and conduct rules should be disclosed. Election crimes coordinators assigned to FBI field offices are not by themselves proof that agents will be stationed at polling places.

Status: Active federal litigation; no polling-place deployment has been confirmed

On September 2026, nine civil rights and labor organizations sued DHS, ICE, DOJ, the FBI, and senior administration officials in the US District Court for the District of Columbia. The case, NAACP et al. v. Department of Homeland Security et al., alleges that official statements, aggressive immigration enforcement, voter investigations, and the removal of longstanding safeguards have created an objectively intimidating environment for Black, Latino, and Asian voters, naturalized citizens, and members of mixed-status families.

Status: Documented warnings and legislative proposals

Administration officials and allied proposals have warned election administrators that they could face prosecution, arrest, or other penalties for resisting federal demands or failing to follow new requirements. Election crimes should be prosecuted when supported by evidence, but vague or politically directed threats can intimidate officials performing lawful duties and encourage defensive decisions that interfere with voting.

Status: Documented threats and rhetoric; implementation varies

The administration has warned officials about possible prosecution, arrest, or loss of federal funding if they resist federal election demands. The September complaint also alleges that the administration conditioned the withdrawal of immigration enforcement personnel from Minnesota on state officials surrendering private voter roll data. That allegation is part of active litigation but has not been adjudicated.

Status: Continuing and documented

Election offices have installed bullet-resistant glass, panic buttons, and cameras in response to threats and harassment. Misinformation, subpoenas, and records seizure efforts can intensify the pressure. When experienced administrators resign, election systems lose institutional knowledge and become more vulnerable to staffing shortages, errors, and certification conflict.

Status: Documented subpoenas and court challenges

Federal investigators have sought names, addresses, or identifying information concerning election administrators and ballot workers. A court quashed at least one Fulton County demand as unreasonable. Collecting workers' personal information without an established connection to wrongdoing can expose them to harassment and discourage qualified people from serving.

Status: Documented organizational change

Election security personnel were placed on leave, programs were curtailed, and cooperation with state and local election offices was reduced. This can weaken defenses against hacking, foreign interference, ransomware, disinformation, and AI-generated impersonation at a time when those risks are increasing.

Status: Documented

Managers were reassigned, pending voting rights cases were dismissed, and experienced attorneys departed. Resources were redirected toward voter roll demands, non-citizen voting investigations, and state compliance. The concern is not that these subjects may never be investigated, but that traditional enforcement protecting voters from discrimination and unlawful barriers may receive less attention.

Status: Documented and legally disputed

Trump removed three bipartisan Election Assistance Commission members, leaving the agency without its normal bipartisan leadership. Because the EAC develops voting system guidance, distributes election assistance, and supports administrators, disputed presidential control could weaken its independence or subject technical guidance to partisan influence.

Status: Documented; officials' statements differ

Senior administration officials and nominees have denied Trump lost, described the election as "rigged," or answered only that Joe Biden was certified rather than acknowledging that he won. The record is not identical for every official. JD Vance has expressly denied Trump lost. Russ Vought and Todd Blanche have advanced affirmative "rigged" claims. Kash Patel, Pam Bondi, Christopher Landau, Jonathan Gould, Billy Long, Stephen Miran, and Kevin Warsh have used varying forms of procedural or evasive answers.

Status: Documented federal investigation

Federal agents seized election materials in Fulton County, Georgia, years after recounts and reviews confirmed the certified result. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard's reported presence intensified concerns that the investigation could be politicized.

Status: Documented

Government communications and advertising have used language and themes associated with Trump's campaign messaging. Using public funds to promote a partisan political message can blur the line between official government communication and campaign activity, and can give one party an advantage in shaping public perception ahead of an election.

Status: Active political strategy and litigation

Trump and allied organizations have encouraged states to redraw congressional districts before the next regular redistricting cycle. Redistricting does not prevent an individual from casting a ballot, but partisan maps can allow one party to win a disproportionate number of seats and can dilute the practical effect of voters' choices. Courts may review racial gerrymandering and violations of state law, while federal claims based solely on partisan advantage face substantial limitations.

Status: Recurring state and local risk

Some local officials have delayed or threatened to refuse certification based on unsupported fraud claims. Certification is generally a mandatory administrative duty, not authority to discard results. Courts can compel certification, but attempted refusals can create delay, confusion, and manufactured doubt that may be exploited at later stages. See Item 23 for the separate danger of disregarding winners who have already been certified.

Status: Serious constitutional contingency to monitor; no publicly verified operational plan

Before a new Congress assembles, 2 U.S.C. Section 26 directs the Clerk of the preceding House to prepare the roll of representatives-elect. The Clerk then calls the incoming House to order and presides while it elects a Speaker. Former federal appellate judge J. Michael Luttig warns that a partisan Clerk or other House officials could attempt to omit enough certified representatives-elect to change which party appears to control the chamber. The artificially constituted House could then elect a Speaker and attempt to keep those winners from taking their seats.

Status: Presidential proposal and rhetoric; not current law

Trump has called for Republicans to "nationalize" elections. The Constitution assigns election administration primarily to the states, subject to laws enacted by Congress; a president cannot unilaterally take over elections. However, federal voter data demands, agency initiatives, funding conditions, and enforcement deployments could produce greater practical federal control even without a formal takeover. Item 25 addresses the more extreme and distinct proposal to invoke emergency or military authority.

Status: Advocacy and reported contingency; no declaration or operational order has been established

Trump allies and election denial activists have urged the use of martial law, emergency authority, or a national security declaration if Republicans lose control of Congress. Reported scenarios include federal intervention during voting or the post-election counting period, delayed certification, seizure of ballots or equipment, or attempts to prevent valid results from taking effect. No public evidence establishes that Trump has issued such an order or that agencies have adopted an operational plan.

Status: Continuing presidential rhetoric, contradicted by the established record

Trump continues to claim that he won or that the election was stolen, despite certified results, recounts, audits, investigations, and unsuccessful court challenges. Repetition of the claim encourages distrust of election institutions and can prepare supporters and public officials to reject future results in which preferred candidates lose. Item 18 addresses the separate institutional risk posed by officials who repeat, endorse, or refuse to contradict that claim.

Status: Documented campaign promise; not enacted or funded; legality unresolved

Trump has promised a "Trump dividend" if Republicans retain control of both chambers of Congress. The proposal would require congressional authorization and has not been funded. Tying a specific cash payment to one party's electoral victory can resemble an inducement to support that party and raises questions under federal election and anti-coercion laws. Whether it constitutes a crime would depend on the complete facts, intent, and interpretation by prosecutors and courts; it should not presently be described as an adjudicated felony.

Status: Documented presidential attacks and federal investigative activity; no public evidence establishes fraud in California's lawful count

Trump has repeatedly portrayed California's gradual mail ballot count as evidence of fraud when later-reported ballots change preliminary totals. After California's June primary, he claimed without publicly presenting evidence that the election was being "rigged." First Assistant US Attorney Bill Essayli subsequently said his office was pursuing multiple election fraud investigations and a federal prosecutor visited the Los Angeles County ballot processing center. Neither Trump nor Essayli publicly identified evidence showing that the normal vote counting process itself was fraudulent.

Status: Documented decision not to invite the OSCE for the midterms

The United States did not invite the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and Parliamentary Assembly to observe the midterm elections. The OSCE has observed every US federal election since 2002 — federal elections including six midterms — making this the first federal election during that period without an invitation.

Status: Documented federal administrative changes; active litigation

The administration removed from the Federal Post Card Application a checkbox used by US citizens who were born and remain abroad and have never lived in the United States. It also removed state-by-state guidance from the Federal Voting Assistance Program's Voting Assistance Guide that had explained when these citizens could vote through a parent, spouse, legal guardian, or other qualifying connection to a state. The Department of Defense used an emergency process to revise the form shortly before the election.

Status: Documented; Ocean County eligibility review; discrimination and legal violations alleged; no court ruling

In Bay Head, New Jersey, a local Republican official compiled a list of voters whose property tax bills were mailed outside the borough. According to the ACLU of New Jersey, the list included Democratic and unaffiliated voters while omitting Republicans in the same situation. The list was sent to the Ocean County Board of Elections, which mailed domicile questionnaires warning recipients that their right to vote could be challenged for the November election and scheduled an October eligibility review.

Status: Documented Georgia request and reported advocacy for federal intervention; no federal seizure or order to replace voting systems has been announced

Georgia's State Election Board asked the Justice Department and Department of Homeland Security to declare the state's voting system non-compliant, compel an immediate software update, and establish a six-month deadline to phase out or change aspects of the system. The request came shortly before early voting and invited federal intervention in equipment previously certified for statewide use.

Status: Documented federal investigations; undercover operations were considered but have not been publicly confirmed as deployed

Records obtained by Democracy Forward under the Freedom of Information Act and reported beginning October 2026 show that ICE's Homeland Security Investigations examined more than nonprofit and civic organizations involved in voter registration. The records describe reviews of at least organizations in Pennsylvania and in New Jersey, along with organizations in Ohio, Minnesota, Washington DC, and other states. Investigators used nonprofit search tools and other databases to look for what the records called "derogatory information." Investigation alone is not evidence that any organization or voter violated the law.